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Soft Law in Environmental Matters and the
Role of the European Courts: Too Much or
Too Little of It?
Mariolina Eliantonio *
I. Introduction
Environmental policy entered the EU Treaties with the Single European Act. The
Maastricht Treaty significantly changed and strengthened the provisions on environ-
mental law and policy, as it made environmental protection an explicit aim of the
European Community (EC), now European Union (EU), and empowered the
Council to adopt environmental measures by qualified majority voting and no
longer unanimity.1 Since the entry into force of the Treaty in 1993, EC (now
EU) activity in the field of environmental policy has accelerated, resulting in an
impressive body of legislative and non-legislative measures, which includes, according
to the Commission, more than 200 pieces of EU legislation.2 Some legislation is
sector-specific covering water, air, nature, waste, noise, and chemicals. Other meas-
ures are horizontal in nature and cut across all environmental sectors, for example,
environmental impact assessments, access to environmental information, public par-
ticipation in environmental decision making, and liability for environmental damage.
Many of these measures deal with extremely technical issues, for example
standards for pollutants such as ozone, particulate matter, and nitrogen dioxide,
the requirements to ensure that surface waters in the EU keep a ‘good ecological
status’ and a ‘good chemical status’ or the adequate conservation measures to
preserve a certain natural habitat. Because of the consequent difficulties in the
interpretation and application of the relevant pieces of EU law for national
administrations, the environmental field has seen an impressive growth in the
* Mariolina Eliantonio, Maastricht University, PO Box 616 6200, MD. Tel: +31 43 3883189;
Email: m.eliantonio@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1 Subsequent treaties have not made significant changes as regards environmental policy. The Lisbon
Treaty, however, did introduce Art. 3(2) TEU, which reads: ‘[T]he Union shall establish an internal
market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe . . . aiming at . . . a high level of
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment.’ In addition, Art. 19(1) TFEU has
added fighting climate change to the aims the environmental policy of the EU.
2 <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/basics/benefits-law/applying-eu-law/index_en.htm> accessed
18 October 2018.
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use of soft law measures. These measures come in the various forms of guidance
documents, Commission notes, interpretative communications, and so on.
The recurrent and widespread use of soft law documents has sparked a very
intense academic debate which is of relevance beyond the field of environmental
policy. Importantly, it has been considered that the legal effects of soft law
cannot be clearly determined,3 and that this uncertainty is clearly at odds
with the proposition that the EU is ‘a Community based on the rule of
law’.4 Furthermore, there are no rules concerning the publication of soft law,
making its dissemination and accessibility at best questionable.5 The procedure
for the adoption of soft law may be characterized by ‘an (extreme) lack of
transparency’.6 Moreover, since soft law is not geared towards establishing
new policies and legislation, the minimum consultation requirements set in
the Commission Guidelines on Impact Assessment7 do not apply to soft law.8
This makes soft law shaky from the point of view of input legitimacy, since those
who will be affected by it do not have any chance to influence its content.
Additionally, the use of soft law instruments can allow the Commission to
escape Council, Parliament, or comitology oversight which would be obligatory
under the procedures set up to issue delegating and implementing acts.9 It has
also been argued that specific legitimacy risks arise when the Commission in-
terprets EU soft law ‘in a—too—flexible and subjective manner, creating con-
fusion about and sometimes even adding to the existing legal obligations’.10
It can also be questioned whether soft law, because of its non-binding nature,
is able to achieve the objective of the uniform application of EU law. In fact, it
has been suggested that EU soft law might even run counter to that objective.
This is because of the confusion over the legal effects of soft law measures which
may arise in the national authorities’ and courts’ minds.11
Finally, it has been noted that, by taking soft law instruments into account,
the European courts can broaden the scope of EU competences, thereby altering
the extent of the obligations for Member States arising from primary law.12 In
particular, it has been argued that the use of soft law in court may have the effect
of transforming soft law into hard law, since the European courts may recognize
certain legal effects to soft law measures, thereby endowing soft law measures
3 L Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 461 and ff.
4 Case 294/83, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, para. 23.
5 Senden (n 3), 496-497.
6 L Senden, ‘Soft Post-Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent Control’ (2013)
European Law Journal, 65.
7 Commission Staff Working Document, Better Regulation Guidelines COM(2015), 19 May 2015,
Chapter III.
8 Senden (n 6), 69–9.
9 Senden (n 6), 58.
10 L Senden and A van den Brink, Checks and Balances of Soft EU Rule-Making, available at<http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN>,16.
11 Ibid 16–17.
12 Senden (n 3), 393–7.
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with hard law effects.13 It has also been considered that this process of hardening
can happen through recognition by the court of the fact that certain general
principles of law, such as legitimate expectations and legal certainty, operate in
connection with soft law measures.14 Snyder has considered that the interplay
between hard law and soft law may result in the granting of certain legal effects
to soft law measures, when the court refers to a soft law measure in a ruling and
the Commission later uses that ruling. In this way, ‘soft law, based partly on a
court judgment, is transformed into hard law by administrative decision’.15 The
hardening of soft law through judicial practice can be considered as problematic
not only for the purposes of the rule of law, but also because of the other
problems highlighted above connected to soft law making, ie its legitimacy
deficit. The claim is, therefore, that the Court of Justice is ‘fostering illegitimate
ways of decision-making and thus widens the democratic deficit of the European
Union’.16
Interestingly, the soft law debate has also witnessed an opposite claim: instead
of engaging too much with soft law, the Court of Justice has been ‘accused’ of
not engaging sufficiently with it. In particular, it has been argued that, because
of the legitimacy concerns highlighted above, the Court of Justice ought not to
be ‘fooled’ by the seemingly non-binding nature of soft law and review soft law
measures which are able to produce legal effects.17 This is because soft law
measures do have an influence on Member States’ behaviour and, as long as
an allegedly unlawful soft law measure is not annulled, it remains lawful and is
capable of generating indirect legal effects, by imposing, for example, new legal
obligations upon Member States and other parties that are not as such contained
in the underlying primary or secondary enabling EU measure.18
Despite the serious potential legal consequences attached to the use of soft law
by the European Courts (or the lack thereof ), the issue has, so far, received little
academic attention, especially from an empirical point of view.19 This paper
aims partially to fill this academic gap by examining the ways in which the
European courts treat soft law measures stemming from EU environmental
legislation.
13 See e.g. E Korkea-aho, ‘EU Soft Law in Domestic Legal Systems: Flexibility and Diversity
Guaranteed?’, (2009) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 277, <https://doi.
org/10.1177/1023263X0901600302>.
14 H Hofmann, ‘Negotiated and Non-Negotiated Administrative Rule-Making—The Example of
EC Competition Policy’ (2006), Common Market Law Review, 165.
15 F Snyder, ‘Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community’, in S Martin (ed.),The
Construction of Europe (Dordrecht: Springer, 1994), 197–225, at 216.
16 O Stefan, Soft Law in Court. Competition Law, State Aid and the Court of Justice of the European
Union (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2012), 22.
17 J Scott, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative
Law’ (2011) Common Market Law Review, 329–55, at 331–2.
18 Senden (n 6), 66.
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Environmental policy is an interesting case study in this respect because of the
wealth of soft law measures as well as the fact that, as mentioned above, the
environment is an area that can be extremely technical and can change rapidly in
light of scientific advances. These factors render the need for explanatory docu-
ments in the form of soft law measures an almost indispensable tool for the
Member States that need to transpose and apply EU environmental legislation.
This paper will first provide a definition of soft law and the scope of the
analysis will be clarified. Thereafter, the methodology will be explained. Sections
3 and 4 will provide quantitative as well as qualitative analysis of the use made of
soft law by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in environ-
mental matters. These two analytical sections will show that soft law is hardly
referred to, has never been challenged, and is generally acknowledged as non-
binding. Section 5 will conclude by responding to the two claims discussed
above concerning the use that European courts have made or ought to make
of environmental soft law.
II. Definitions, scope of the analysis, and methodology
In the following, soft law will be used in the definition given by Senden, as ‘rules
of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed
legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal
effects, and that are aimed at and may produce practical effects’.20
Taking the environmental field and reviewing the sub-areas within this policy
field where the EU has enacted legislation, the sample of Directives listed in
Table 1 and corresponding soft law measures have been selected.21
These Directives can be considered as representative because of their relative
importance in the field of environmental law. Moreover, this selection consti-
tutes a mix of older and newer directives as well as directives which are the
products of a more ‘traditional’ way of EU law making (such as the Habitats
Directive) and directives which can instead be ascribed to the category of ex-
perimentalist governance (such as the Water Framework Directive).22 Finally,
there are more ‘substantive’ directives and more ‘procedural’ directives (such as
the EIA and SEA Directives).
20 Senden (n 3), 112. See Senden also (ibid. 219–20) for a possible categorization.
21 Please note that the research is updated to 1 July 2018. Legislative materials and case law after this
date is not taken into account. The list of the selected soft law measures are contained in Annex I.
22 On experimentalism, especially with regard to environmental law and the Water Framework
Directive, see I von Homeyer, ‘Emerging experimentalism in EU environmental governance’ in C
Sabel and C Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the EU: Towards a New Architecture (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010); E Korkea-aho, ‘Watering Down the Court of Justice? The dynamics
between network implementation and Article 258 TFEU litigation’ (2014) European Law Journal,
664–5.
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The soft law measures stemming from these directives can all be ascribed the
category of interpretative rules; there does not seem to be, amongst the soft law
measures selected, any decisional instrument. While the first type of measures
serves to interpret provisions of binding EU law, the second indicates the
manner in which an EU institution intends to exercise its discretion.23 The
common denominator of these guidance documents is that of explaining how
to interpret and apply certain provisions of EU environmental law. By way of
example, they provide Member States with guidance on eg the identification of
water bodies (CIS—Common Implementation Strategy—Guidance No. 2), the
analysis of pressures and impacts (CIS Guidance No. 3), monitoring (CIS
Guidance No. 7) etc. in the broad context of the development of integrated
river basin management plans as required by the Water Framework Directive.
Their publication as well as translation status varies significantly: many guid-
ance documents are only available in English and on the website of DG envir-
onment, while others are translated (often not in all official languages), and have
been published in the Official Journal. Moreover, while some are authored by
the Commission, others are only ‘endorsed’ by the Commission and have been
prepared by consultants. Their names also change, varying from Guidance
Document, Guideline, Communication, Working Document, and so on.24
Table 1. Legal instruments selected and relevant soft law associated with them
Area Directive Soft law measures
Water Water Framework Directivea 34 guidance documents
Waste Waste Framework Directiveb 1 guidance document
Biodiversity Habitats Directivec 15 guidance documents
Birds Directived 1 guidance document
Land use Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directivee 16 guidance documents
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directivef 2 guidance documents
aDirective 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy [200] OJ L 327-1.
bDirective 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008
on waste and repealing certain Directives [2008] OJ L 312-3. cCouncil Directive 92/43/EEC of
21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora [1992] OJ L
206-7. dDirective 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November
2009 on the conservation of wild birds [2010] OJ L 20-7. eDirective 2011/92/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects
of certain public and private projects on the environment [2012] OJ L 26-1. fDirective 2001/42/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the
effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment [2001] OJ L 197-30.
23 Scott (n 17), 1. Admittedly, decisional acts are mostly common in other EU policy fields, such as
competition and state aid matters, and less in the environmental policy.
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The question central to this paper is how European courts have, in the cases
before them, treated soft law. The instances in which this situation may occur
are, first of all, in an action for annulment pursuant to Article 263 TFEU of a
soft law measure itself, or a hard law provision, where an argument based on a
related soft law measure is brought forward or, alternatively in a preliminary
question of validity pursuant to Article 267 TFEU. Alternatively, soft law can
come to the attention of the court through a preliminary question of interpret-
ation of the soft law measure itself or of a hard law measure related to a soft law
instrument on the basis of Article 267 TFEU. Finally, soft law can be referred to
infringement proceedings brought by the Commission against a Member State
according to Article 265 TFEU. For the purposes of the current analysis, rulings
and orders of the CJEU and the General Court as well as opinions of AGs have
been considered.
The EU courts could thus be vested directly with the question of reviewing
the legality of a soft law provision or solving doubts on its interpretation or
could indirectly use soft law for the interpretation of hard law provisions.
This paper aims to provide both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis of
the role of soft law before European courts in environmental matters. This
research is carried out through a textual analysis of the judgments and orders
of the CJEU and the General Court and the opinions of the AGs referring to
soft measures. The Civil Service Tribunal has no competence on environmental
matters and its case law was therefore excluded. Only closed cases have been
selected.
Drawing inspiration from previous work,25 it is first assessed to what extent
relevant soft law measures are present in the rulings of EU courts’, relative to the
importance they have for the specific instrument at stake. This research was
carried out through the search engine provided on the website of the Court of
Justice.26 The search was carried out by using the numbers of the relevant
Directive, operating under the assumption that when a soft law measure stem-
ming from a certain Directive is used in court, reference is made to the hard law
measure which justified the issuing of the soft law measure. Rulings, orders, and
opinions which were listed as being relevant, but for which no information was
available have been excluded. Rulings, orders, and opinions which were listed as
being relevant, but which did not in substance deal with the selected Directives,
have equally been excluded. The exclusion covered cases in which one of the
relevant Directives was mentioned, but in which the legal problem did not
concern the Directive at stake (in the form of, eg, a question of interpretation
of a provision of the Directive in a preliminary ruling of interpretation, the non-
or wrong transposition of part of the Directive in infringement proceedings).
25 Stefan (n 16), especially Appendix 1.
26 <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en>.
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Secondly, where soft law measures are present in the rulings, it is examined
how they are treated by the courts, ie what status and legal effects are recognized
in them.
III. Quantitative analysis
Table 2 shows the results of the search as carried out in the search engine
provided in the website of the Court of Justice.27
Table 2 shows, first of all, that relative to the total number of cases relating to
the selected Directives, soft law plays a rather minor role. Despite, therefore, its
alleged importance for the Commission and national administrations, soft law is
not often invoked or discussed before the European courts. Also, it is mostly
discussed by Advocate Generals, and much more rarely taken up in the actual
rulings. This stands in contrast with eg competition and state aid policy, where
soft law references by the European Courts and the Advocates General are much
higher.28
Secondly, looking at the time span, it can be observed that reference to soft law
is a rather recent phenomenon: despite, for example, the Habitats Directive being
in existence for more than 20 years, soft law was not was referred to in court in a
preliminary question concerning the interpretation of the Directive before 2004.
This trend is in line with other policy fields in which indeed the European
Courts have significantly increased their references to soft law over the years.29
Table 2. Total number of cases concerning the selected legal instruments and number







Water Framework Directive 28 2 (in AG opinions)
Waste Framework Directive 17 0
Habitats Directive 97 11 (8 in AG opinions
and 3 in rulings)
Birds Directive 84 0
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive 89 0
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive 21 2 (in AG opinions)
27 See Annex II for a list of the cases in which the guidance documents are mentioned.
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Table 3 provides a chronological overview of the references to soft law stem-
ming from the selected EU measures.
If one compares this information with the years in which the selected soft law
was adopted, this result is not surprising, as the phenomenon of guidance
documents also seems to be a relatively recent one. This is also the case for
older Directives, such as the EIA Directive.30
Table 4 provides an overview of the years of enactment of the selected soft law
measures, subdivided according to the underlying Directives.





























































Water Framework Directive [2000]
Habitats Directive [1992]
30 Compare here the results of Stefan (n 16), 77 ff. Please note that for one guidance document
stemming from the SEA Directive, the document contained no indication of the year hence it was
not included in this table.
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Thirdly, the actual number of guidance documents or of rulings concerning a
specific Directive does not seem to be correlated to the use of soft law in court.
While the Water Framework Directive is the instrument with most guidance
documents, soft law relating to it was discussed in only two cases. Similarly, the
EIA Directive has often been the subject matter of claims before the European
Courts, but the guidance documents stemming from it seem never to have been
discussed before the European Courts.
Nor can one observe a link between the ‘age’ of the Directive and the use of
soft law. The EIA Directive is older than the Habitats Directive and yet the
European Courts never discussed the supporting guidance documents in the
cases brought before them.
Interestingly, the ‘experimentalist’ and vague nature of the instrument also does not
increase the use of soft law made by the European courts. This is, as such, a very
counterintuitive observation, as one would expect an increased use of guidance docu-
ments by the European courts in respect to legislative measures which contain open-
ended key provisions. By way of example, many of the key terms of the Water
Framework Directive (as ‘key’ as the one concerning the definition of ‘good water
status’) are not defined in the Directive itself and only specified in the ensuing soft
law. One might expect, therefore, that the Court of Justice would use these soft law
measures which, it may be argued, are an essential part of the legislative measure itself.
IV. Qualitative analysis
A. The justiciability of soft law
If one looks at the types of cases in which soft law has been at stake, the first
striking observation is that no action for annulment or preliminary question of
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validity has been brought against a soft law measure itself. Without being able to
give conclusive evidence for this statement, one of the reasons for this absence
could be related to the strict admissibility conditions set by the Court of Justice,
which would have barred a claim against a guidance document.
First of all, as noted by Scott, in order to be reviewable, a measure needs to be
an act adopted by the European institutions pursuant to Articles 263 and 267
TFEU, and it is likely that guidance documents which have been adopted
jointly by the Commission and the Member States, will not meet this criter-
ion.31 This would automatically exclude from challenge the guidance docu-
ments issued, for example, in the context of the Water Framework Directive,
since the emphasis in these documents is put on joint authorship. Despite the
Commission’s active role in the drafting of these documents, it has been con-
sidered unlikely that for the guidance stemming from the Water Framework
Directive, the Court of Justice will not readily consider the EU authorship
requirement fulfilled.32
The authorship requirement, however, seems far from clear when analysing
the case law of the Court of Justice beyond the environmental field, and there is
at the very least scope for doubt as to whether a claim against certain guidance
documents drafted in cooperation between the Commission and the Member
States will be considered admissible.
For example, in Deutsche Shell, the Court of Justice considered the nature of
the recommendations adopted by a Joint Committee created within the frame-
work of a Convention in force between the Community and the EFTA coun-
tries.33 In this case, the Court held that ‘measures emanating from bodies which
have been established by an international agreement of that type, and which
have been entrusted with responsibility for its implementation, are directly
linked to the agreement which they implement, they form part of the
Community legal order’.34 Similarly, in another case concerning the decisions
of an Association Council, created by the EU Turkey Association Agreement,
the Court held that ‘[S]ince the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings on the Agreement, in so far as it is an act adopted by one of the insti-
tutions of the Community . . . , it also has jurisdiction to give rulings on the
interpretation of the decisions adopted by the authority established by the
Agreement and entrusted with responsibility for its implementation’.35
Finally, in the recent James Elliott case, the Court of Justice declared itself to
have jurisdiction to interpret standards adopted by the European standardiza-
tion bodies, because these measures, although they are adopted by private bodies
31 Scott (n 17), 337.
32 E Korkea-aho, Adjudicating New Governance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 173–4.
33 Case C-188/91, Deutsche Shell AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg ECLI:EU:C:1993:24.
34 Ibid, para. 17.
35 C-192/89, Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie ECLI:EU:C:1990:322, para. 10.
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and only ‘endorsed’ by the Commission, are taken to be an implementation of
EU law.36
Although these rulings are not specific to the field of environmental law and
do not concern annulment actions, it could nevertheless be argued, on the basis
of this case law, that the Court might be willing to go beyond a strict interpret-
ation of the authorship criterion at least for those soft law measures which
directly stem from secondary EU law measures.
For guidance documents which might be considered as stemming solely from
the Commission (such as those issued in the context of the Habitats Directive),
and for which, therefore, the authorship requirement does not constitute a
hurdle to the admissibility of a claim against them, their justiciability, at least
in terms of direct actions, will be limited by a second condition imposed by the
Court of Justice.
In order for an act to be reviewable, it must be ‘intended to produce legal
effects vis-à-vis third parties’ according to Article 263 TFEU and the Court of
Justice’s case law.37 This has been held to be the case when guidance is construed
as introducing a new obligation,38 where a soft law measure states the way in
which an EU institution intends to exercise its discretion,39 or, as far as Member
States are concerned, where the soft law measure at stake has been produced in
cooperation with the Member States.40
It is very likely that the guidance document issued in the framework of the
selected Directives will not fulfil any of the three above mentioned requirements
for admissibility. Leaving the first requirement aside for the moment, with
regards to the second requirement, the guidance documents stemming from
the selected Directives constitute interpretative aid, and mostly for Member
States, thus one cannot find situations of a guidance document containing
statements of how in particular the European Commission is going to exercise
its discretion.
Concerning the third requirement, while it is true that for many of the
guidance documents which fall within the scope of this paper, Member States
have been consulted or have even cooperated in the drafting of the documents
and endorsed them, this circumstance will not render them justiciable. This is
36 C-613/14, James Elliott Constructions Limited v Irish Asphalt Limited, ECLI:EU:C:2016:821, para.
34: ‘the Court has jurisdiction to interpret acts which, while indeed adopted by bodies which cannot
be described as “institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union”, are by their nature measures
implementing or applying an act of EU law’. See for a comment to this case, C Colombo and M
Eliantonio, ‘Harmonized technical standards as part of EU law: Juridification with a number of
unresolved legitimacy concerns? Case C-613/14 James Elliot Construction Limited v. Irish Asphalt
Limited, EU:C:2016:821’ (2017) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 323–40.
37 Case 22-70, Commission v Council ECLI:EU:C:1971:32, para. 42.
38 Case C-366/88, France v Commission (Internal Instructions) ECLI:EU:C:1990:348.
39 Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P, C-208/02 P, and C-213/02 P, Dansk
Rørindustri and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2005:408.
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because Member States’ acceptance of a soft law instrument is not itself a suf-
ficient element for its justiciability: what is crucial is that a measure has been
adopted in the framework of a specific cooperation obligation between the
Member States and the Commission,41 which is not the case with the soft
law instruments analysed in the context of this article. This conclusion, however,
creates a rather artificial differentiation vis-à-vis many environmental soft law
measures which, despite being adopted in a negotiated context, do not fit the
strict Ijssel-Vliet requirements, and therefore profit from a sort of ‘immunity’
from judicial review.
In respect of the first requirement, it is invariably the case that the guidance
documents at stake contain disclaimers as to their non-binding nature and that
they do not intend to create any new obligations. However, as discussed for the
Water Framework Directive (but the argument is equally applicable to other
measures which contain vague requirements and do not necessarily present an
‘experimentalist’ nature, such as Article 6 of the Habitats Directive), it is very
hard to draw a line between ‘fleshing out’42 existing obligations, or rendering
obligations ‘more explicit’43 on the one hand, and creating new obligations, on
the other hand.44 This renders the legal effects criterion difficult to apply and its
outcome rather unpredictable.
The production of legal effects, however, seems not be a necessary require-
ment in a preliminary question of validity. Indeed, with regard to the scope of
the Court’s jurisdiction in preliminary questions of validity, in Grimaldi, which
concerned a piece of soft law, namely a Commission Recommendation, the
Court of Justice held that ‘[I]t is sufficient to state in that respect that, unlike
Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, which excludes review by the Court of acts in the
nature of recommendations, Article 177 confers on the Court jurisdiction to
give a preliminary ruling on the validity and interpretation of all acts of the
institutions of the Community without exception’.45 Although the broad juris-
diction of the Court of Justice in validity questions has recently been questioned
by AG Cruz Villalón in the Gauweiler case, the statement in Grimaldi has, as
such, never been retracted by the Court of Justice and therefore still constitutes
good law.46 In this context, it must be added that the reference made by the AG
to the Friesland case47 does in fact seem to corroborate rather than weaken this
conclusion. In this case, indeed, the Court reiterated the above mentioned
41 Ibid para. 44.
42 Case C-325/91, France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:245, para. 14
43 Case C-366/88, France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1990:348, para. 23.
44 Korkea-aho (n 32), 175.
45 Case C-322/88 Salvatore Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles ECLI:EU:C:1989:646,
para. 8. On Grimaldi and its consequences, see E Korkea-aho, in this Special Issue.
46 AG Cruz Villalón, Case C-62/14, Peter Gauweiler and others v Deutscher Bundestag
ECLI:EU:C:2015:7, on which see further, J Alberti, in this Special Issue.
47 Case C-11/05, Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane Noord/
kantoor Groningen EU:C:2006:312, paras 34–42.
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paragraph of Grimaldi concerning the broad jurisdiction of the court in validity
questions, and dismissed the question of a preliminary ruling not on the alleged
lack of legal effects of the measure at stake, but on the authorship criterion.
Hence, it can be concluded that the lack of judicial protection in cases of a
direct challenge of guidance documents could be partially filled through an
indirect challenge pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.48
B. Soft law as an interpretational tool
The validity of the soft law selected for this contribution has therefore never
challenged, its presence being detectable before the European Courts only in
interpretation, and overwhelmingly so in preliminary questions of interpretation
and, less so, in infringement proceedings. In only one annulment case did the
European courts refer to soft law, when the annulment of a hard law provision
was at stake and soft law was used for interpretation purposes.
In a case concerning the Water Framework Directive,49 when dealing with the
legal issue at stake, ie the interpretation of the concept of ‘deterioration’, the AG
refers in his last argument to a specific Guidance Document which, he states, has
been mentioned by ‘several parties’ to the proceedings. Despite making use of
this document, the AG highlights that the document in itself has no binding
value. In order to support the non-binding force of the guidance document at
stake, he adds that the document is not ‘a communication of the Commission
within the meaning of the case-law in the field of competition law or the law on
financial penalties’,50 thereby making reference to the category of ‘decisional
acts’ which the Court has long considered binding on the issuing institution.51
This statement almost seems to suggest that the field of competition law and the
soft law adopted in this policy area are to be regarded as peculiar cases, and the
case law concerning the effect of soft law adopted in competition policy is not to
be extended to other policy fields.
Similarly, in an infringement case concerning the question of whether France
had taken sufficient measures to protect the European hamster as required by
the Habitats Directive, the AG refers extensively to a Guidance Document
supporting the Habitats Directive, and states that, although not binding, it
‘contains useful guidance on the interpretation of the relevant provisions’.52
The AG thus incorporates soft law in her considerations to reach her
48 See also E Korkea-aho in this Special Issue, who makes reference to the Kotnik and Others case to
support this statement. Case C-526/14, Kotnik and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:570.
49 Opinion of Advocate General in case C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2324.
50 Ibid, para. 107.
51 See C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and
Others v Commission, EU:C:2005:408, paras 211–213.
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conclusions on France’s alleged non-compliance with the Directive, but she
keeps the non-binding nature of the Guidance Document clear.
The same can be observed with regard to the AG opinion in the
Waddenvereniging and Vogelsbeschermingvereniging case.53 The Guidance
Document ‘Managing Natura 2000 Sites’ in this case plays a prominent role
in the opinion of the Advocate General, who refers to the document on several
occasions, but mostly only with regard to the submission of the parties: first, to
support the interpretation of the concepts of ‘plan or project’ in the Habitats
Directive;54 secondly, to distinguish the scope of application of Articles 6(2) and
(3) of the Directive;55 and thirdly, to support the interpretation of the concept
of ‘adverse effects’.56
It is only in one place of the actual opinion that the AG referred to two
Guidance Documents issued in the context of the Habitats Directive: while
stating that the Habitats Directive does not lay down any methods for carrying
out an appropriate assessment, he adds that ‘it may be helpful to refer to the
relevant documents of the Commission [ie two supporting Guidance
Documents] even though they are not legally binding’.57
Although not mentioning the expression ‘non-binding’, the AG expressed the
same concept in an infringement case against Ireland, where he clearly stated
that a Guidance Document issued under the Habitats Directive cannot in any
way call into question the scope of the obligations stemming from the Directive
itself.58
In other cases soft law is taken up as an interpretation aid, without mention-
ing its non-binding nature.
In one case, for example, the AG used a Guidance Document issued for the
implementation of the Habitats Directive in the context of explaining the le-
gislative framework. Soft law was thus taken up by the AG in the explanation of
the legislative framework as much as the Habitats Directive itself and the
Court’s case law.59 In a similar fashion, in the context of the Water
Framework Directive, the AG referred to a Guidance Document in a footnote
in order to explain the meaning of a certain provision of the Directive, thereby
incorporating the relevant soft law measure in the entirety of the legislative
framework at stake.60 Interestingly, in the same footnote, the AG refers to the
technical difficulties linked to the interpretation and application of the relevant
53 Opinion of Advocate General in case C-127/02, Waddenvereniging and Vogelsbeschermingvereni-
ging ECLI:EU:C:2004:60.
54 Ibid para. 21.
55 Ibid para. 46.
56 Ibid para. 79.
57 Para. 95.
58 Opinion of Advocate General in case C-183/05, Commission v Ireland ECLI:EU:C:2006:597.
59 Opinion of Advocate General in case C-521/12, T.C. Briels and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:113.
60 Opinion of Advocate General in case Case C-529/15, Gert Folk v Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat
für die Steiermark ECLI:EU:C:2017:1.
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article of the Water Framework Directive, implying that the Guidance
Documents play an essential role in the implementation of the Directive, a
point which has previously been raised in scholarship.61
In another case, the AG extensively used a Guidance Document issued to
support the implementation of the SEA Directive in order to answer the ques-
tion of whether a Member States is required to establish a separate authority
other than the decision-making authority to fulfil the consultation requirements
provided by the SEA Directive.62 Drawing a positive answer, the AG went on to
state that Member States have a broad margin of discretion under the Directive
to organize the environmental consultation procedure. In this context, and to
give flesh to the possible options available to Member States, the AG extensively
referred to the supporting Guidance Document.
The Guidance Document supporting the implementation of the SEA was also
used by the AG in another case, albeit in rather ‘tentative’ terms, to explain how
the likely effects on the environment for the purposes of the obligation to carry
out an SEA are to be evaluated.63
In an infringement case against Finland with regard to the Habitats Directive,
the AG referred to soft law in the context of the interpretation of the derogations
from the legal prohibitions relating to the protection of species in order to
protect human life and human health.64 In this context, the AG supported
Finland’s interpretation, which had made reference to a supporting Guidance
Document. In particular, the AG used the Guidance Document to distil the
Commission’s interpretation of the provision at stake without referring to its
legal value.
Interestingly, this is one of the only three cases in which soft law has been
referred in an actual CJEU’s ruling. In this context, the Court was called to
decide whether killing a limited number of specimens could be regarded as
having an adverse effect on the objectives envisaged by the Habitats Directive.
The Court in that instance ‘[F]ollow[ed] the example of the views formulated by
the Commission’.65 In this context it seemed to use the relevant guidance
document as one of the arguments for its interpretation but not as the most
important or authoritative one.
It is difficult to draw conclusions from this case law. Whether these cases
signify the beginning of a trend of European Courts becoming more engaged
with soft law as an interpretational tool in environmental cases is hard to pre-
dict. What seems to be the case, however, is that the European Courts (and
61 Korkea-aho (n 32), 178.
62 Opinion of Advocate General in case C-474/10, Seaport (NI) and Others ECLI:EU:C:2011:490.
63 Opinion of Advocate General in case C-105/09, Terre wallonne and Inter-Environnement Wallonie
ECLI:EU:C:2010:120.
64 Opinion of AG General in case C-342/05 European Commission v Finland ECLI:EU:C:2006:752,
para. 52.
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especially the Advocates General) do feel free to use guidance documents in their
reasoning when this serves the purpose of clarifying the meaning of the relevant
Directives. However, soft law is used as one amongst several interpretation tools
and in no case is it attributed a special authoritative force.
C. Soft law and legal effects
It is only in two cases that soft law seems to have been endowed with legal
effects, both times only by AGs.
In the Nomarchiaki case,66 for example, the AG used a Guidance Document
issued to support the implementation of the Habitats Directive. In particular,
dealing with the potential for a plan or project to be implemented for overriding
reasons of public interest in spite of the negative environmental consequences,
the AG examined the wording of Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive and, in
this context, referred to the Commission ‘having publicly expressed its position’
on the scope of that provision. Reference was then made to the supporting
Guidance Document. It seems, therefore, that the AG was essentially stating
that the existence of the Guidance Document has a self-binding effect on the
Commission to the extent that the opinion on the plan or project required by
Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive is no longer necessary. The AG in this case
appeared to attach a Dansk Rørindustri-like effect to the relevant Guidance
Document.
Is soft law not only self-binding on the Commission, but somehow also
binding on national authorities? In the Sahlstedt case,67 the AG used a
Guidance Document stemming from the Habitats Directive in order to explain
how the margin of discretion of the national authorities in connection with the
implementation of the Directive is rather limited. In this context, he stated that,
through the Guidance Document, the European Commission has further lim-
ited the discretion of the national authorities compared to the limits set in
Article 6 of the Directive. In this opinion, which can be regarded as straining
the principle of legality, the AG seems to disregard the formally non-binding
nature of the guidance document and, in a way, to assume that national autho-
rities will follow the document thereby reducing the margin of their discretion.
These two cases do not constitute a wide enough sample to allow us to draw a
conclusion, and the AGs opinions were not taken up in the subsequent courts’
rulings. However, they could perhaps be taken as signifying that, in the envir-
onmental field, guidance documents could, in certain circumstances, be
endowed with legal effects.
66 Opinion of Advocate General in case C-43/10, Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Aitoloakarnanias and
Others ECLI:EU:C:2011:651.
67 Opinion of Advocate General in case C-362/06 P, Sahlstedt and Others v Commission
ECLI:EU:C:2008:587.
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V. Conclusions
The analysis carried out in this paper shows that, in the environmental field, at
least as far as the selected Directives are concerned, soft law has hardly been
referred to, and has mostly been referred to by AGs. This low number of
references stands in contrast to other areas, such as competition and state aid
cases. One of the possible reasons for this low number of references may be that
many of the selected guidance documents (as is the case of, for example, the EIA
Directive) consolidate prior case law of the Court of Justice. The latter may thus
continue to refer to its earlier case law instead of the relevant guidance docu-
ment. This phenomenon is very hard to test methodologically, because it would
entail not only a detailed knowledge of the technical aspects of the texts
involved,68 but also the need to carry out interviews with judges on the deci-
sional process leading up to the rulings at stake.69 And even where interviews
were carried out, the conclusions drawn might be partial given the secrecy
requirement of judicial deliberations.
Furthermore, it appears that the attitude of the European Courts and AGs
towards soft law is relatively random and ad hoc. Soft law is used and referred to
when needed (mostly for interpretational purposes), but there does not seem to
be any conceptualization behind the use of soft law in Luxembourg, at least
insofar as environmental policy is concerned.
Another interesting conclusion is that soft law references seem to be a rela-
tively new phenomenon, and one that is unrelated to the number of rulings
concerning the Directive, the number of guidance documents issued concerning
a Directive, the age of the Directive, its procedural, substantive, or experimen-
talist nature.
Moreover, it can be observed that no action for annulment has been brought
against the guidance documents stemming from the selected Directives. Such an
action would likely not be admissible, first, because of the authorship require-
ment, as Member States often cooperate with the Commission in the produc-
tion of these measures. Secondly, in light of a consolidated line of case law, the
guidance documents at stake would probably not be considered by the Court of
Justice as being capable of producing legal effects.
Given such a high bar to admissibility, should an action against a guidance
document (for possible violation of, eg, the underlying Directive or a general
principle of EU law) be brought, it would constitute a significant limitation to
the judicial oversight of soft law, for (at least some of ) the reasons which Scott
has highlighted.70 First of all, these guidance documents produce significant
68 See further on this point, A Beckers, in this Special Issue.
69 Please note that an empirical analysis on the use of EU soft law by national courts is being
undertaken in the framework of a Commission-financed Jean Monnet Network. For more details
see www.solar-network.eu
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practical effects because Member States tend to comply with them. Secondly,
guidance documents may shape and influence the Commission’s enforcement
approach. Thirdly, a bar to judicial review constitutes a missed opportunity to
review soft law’s often intransparent adoption procedure.
In the increasingly common situations of joint authorship and framework
norms, it would therefore be advisable for the European Courts to look beyond
the surface and engage in a review of soft law, possibly through the use of earlier
case law which seems to have departed somewhat from a strict interpretation of
what constitutes ‘an act of the EU institutions’.
Even if there were no change in the case law with regard to direct actions, one
possible way to fill this gap in judicial review, at least for those guidance docu-
ments which could overcome the authorship hurdle, would be the possibility of
an indirect review of soft law measures through a preliminary question of val-
idity in accordance with Article 267 TFEU. Since the overwhelming majority of
the guidance documents stemming from the selected Directives are addressed to
Member States in order to guide their transposition and application process, it
would be possible for a claim to be brought before a national court against a
national measure taken in application of the Directive and thereby to contest
Member State action for application of an allegedly unlawful guidance docu-
ment. The national court, bound by the Foto-Frost limitation,71 would have to
send a preliminary question to the Court of Justice. Unlike the position argued
by Scott,72 I think such a possibility is a real one, given the wide scope of
preliminary questions of validity given by the Court of Justice in Grimaldi,
which encompasses all ‘acts of the EU institutions’.
A further conclusion which can be drawn from the analysis carried out in this
article is that the AGs have in some cases used soft law issued in the context of
the interpretation of the selected Directives, yet its use is limited and almost
absent in the European Courts’ rulings.
The follow-up question is whether, in light of the regulatory framework
which environmental measures increasingly display, environmental soft law
ought to be considered more often in court as interpretational tool. As guidance
documents are frequently issued in cases of vaguely formulated standards and
norms, it is hard to accept that the vague legislation should be reviewed in court
without its subsequent fleshing out in guidance documents. The risk is that
rulings would ‘fail to take into account the real content and the context of
implementation’.73 In other words, if the institutional setup in essence ‘calls
for’ guidance in the form of soft law for the purposes of implementation of an
EU obligation, it seems short-sighted to ignore a relevant piece of information
concerning the implementation of that obligation. This does not mean, as
71 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost ECLI:EU:C:1987:452.
72 Scott (n 17), 345.
73 Korkea-aho (n 32), 178.
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Korkea-aho explains, curtailing judicial independence in interpreting EU law,
but inviting the EU courts to at least discuss the guidance documents which
might be relevant for the case at stake and, if they decide to use a different
interpretation than therein provided, give reasons for doing so.74
Finally, the attitude of the AGs in the Nomarchiaki and Sahlstedt cases would
seem to indicate that the production of legal effects is not completely excluded
in certain situations, which would render certain soft measures justiciable, even
according to the current requirements set by the Court of Justice. However, the
sample of cases where this seems to have happened is very limited at the
moment, and does not allow for any conclusions to be drawn from it.
What can be observed, with regard to the issue of soft law producing legal
effects is that, in the vast majority of cases when soft law was referred to, its non-
binding nature has been implicitly or explicitly acknowledged. Therefore, the
legitimacy concerns stemming from the possible transformation of soft law into
hard law though judicial intervention cannot be maintained, at least as far as the
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Appendix 2 – list of cases in which the selected guidance documents
have been mentioned
Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for
Community action in the field of water policy [2000]] OJ L-327/1).
1. C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Opinion of
Advocate General, ECLI: EU: C: 2014: 2324.
2. C-529/15, Gert Folk v Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat für die Steiermark,
Opinion of Advocate General, ECLI: EU: C: 2017: 1.
Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the
conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora [1992] OJ L-
206/7).
1. C-127/02, Waddenvereniging and Vogelsbeschermingvereniging, Opinion of
Advocate General, ECLI: EU: C: 2004: 60
2. C-127/02, Waddenvereniging and Vogelsbeschermingvereniging, Judgment,
ECLI: EU: C: 2004: 482
3. C-239/04 - Commission v Portugal, Opinion of Advocate General, ECLI: EU:
C: 2006: 255
4. C-183/05, Commission v Ireland, Opinion of Advocate General, ECLI: EU: C:
2006: 597
5. C-342/05, Commission v Finland, Judgment, ECLI: EU: C: 2007: 341
6. C-362/06 P, Sahlstedt and Others v Commission, Opinion of Advocate General,
ECLI: EU: C: 2008: 587
7. C-383/09, Commission v France, Opinion of Advocate General, ECLI: EU: C:
2011: 23
8. C-2/10, Azienda Agro-Zootecnica Franchini and Eolica di Altamura, Opinion
of Advocate General, ECLI: EU: C: 2011: 252
9. C-43/10, Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Aitoloakarnanias and Others, Opinion of
Advocate General, ECLI: EU: C: 2011: 651
10. C -521/12, Briels and Others, Opinion of Advocate General, ECLI: EU: C:
2014: 113
11. C-504/14, Commission v Greece, Judgment, ECLI: EU: C: 2016: 847
Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (Directive 2001/42/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment
of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment [2001] OJ L-
197/30).
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1. C-105/09, Terre wallonne and Inter-Environnement Wallonie, Opinion of
Advocate General, ECLI: EU: C: 2010: 120
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